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Casey Charles 
Making Justice: 
Same-Sex Partnership 
in the Kowalski Case 
If you don't like the news, go out and make some 
of your own. 
(Stephan Ponic, KSAN Radio, 1969) 
... this recognition of our limitation and contin-
gency, of the precarious and pragmatic construc-
tion of the universality of our values ... is the 
very condition for a democratic society. To 
reformulate the values of the Enlightenment in 
the direction of a radical historicism and to 
renounce its rationalistic epistemological and 
ontological foundations, then, is to expand the 
democratic potentialities of that tradition ... 
(Laclau, 1990, 83) 
rom Aristotle to Rawls, theorists have traditionally as-
sociated the concept of justice with a transcendent 
ideal of fairness, equity, and reason. 1 Blindfolded, Jus-
tice sits on a raised dais holding her balanced scales, 
truths and judgments emanating from the oak-paneled 
chambers of her hallowed halls, architecturally, linguis-
tically, and socially separated from a removed popu-
lace. Yet for radical democrats like Ernesto Laclau, the • 
tendency to conceive and implement political values .~ 
., 
like justice within a framework that treats them as uni- "' 
::s 
versal and immutable has dangerous socio-political ~ 
consequences. Theorizing justice as an all-encompass- f 
ing, immanent ideal obfuscates the socially and histori- ·c 
cally constructed nature of justice, undermining its sta- .g 
"' tus as an often arbitrary or contingent adjudication $ 
that is dependent upon a network of social forces. Em- CU 
.. 
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phasis on such a metaphysical conception also perpetuates the idea 
that justice is immanent, self-evident, and transhistorical (see 
Goodrich 1987). These notions, in turn, tend to impede the imple-
mentation of justice within a pragmatic politics that recognizes it not 
:15 an elusive abstraction occasionally approximated by an arcane and 
1~s~ar web of political theorists, but as a malleable, historically-con-
diaoned process that because of its "human and discursive" nature is 
socially constructable within a context, I will argue, as seemingly far 
removed from the public sphere as the bedroom, as the private predi-
lection of romantic lovers. 2 
The ~ritical Legal Studies movement has done much to expose 
the cracks 1n the foundation of justice, the holes in her blindfold, the 
uneven weight of her scales (Unger 1986; Leonard 1995). Gilligan 
has exposed the gender bias of justice; Goodrich analyzed its rhetori-
cal elitism; Sandel (1982), de Man (1979) and others shown how the 
limi~ ~f justice reside in its attempt to be all-encompassing when in 
fact tt is dependent on particular emanations (Gilligan 1982; Okin 
1989; Rhode 1989; Goodrich 1987; Sander 1982; deMan 1979; We-
ber 1992, 232-57) . Even before the advent of postmodernism, the re-
lationship of justice to its practical enactment-the law-had 
troub.led scholars .. ~ile, by many accounts, the law is supposed to 
funcaon as an obJecnfied form of justice at work in the social order 
(Radbruch 1985), the vagaries of the legal code and its interpretation 
have led to Hobbes' famous formulation of the law as the will of the 
sovereign and Holmes, description of it as "what the courts will do" 
~Hobbes 1985; Holmes 1985). Tarnished by its implementation, the 
inherent fairness of justice often conflicts with the political and social 
agendas of those who have the power to determine what is and what is 
not fair. 
.Th~ ~bs~ract and objective proportion of Aristode,s justice and 
~e 1~tu1nve 1nherency of Rawl's fairness are further corroded by the 
~nvas1ve encroachment of morality into the arena of social and legal 
Judgment. Justice is administered through a set of rules or laws that 
c.odify exis~in~ customs, religious beliefs, and individual predilec-
nons-subJecave stances that often have little or nothing to do with a 
supposedly objective concept of fairness (Perelman 1980, 129). The 
c~e stud~ th~t follows presents a particularly telling example of the 
dilemma Justice faces when it is implemented by a court whose cus-
to.mary ignoranc.e and moral disapproval of homosexuality leads to a 
.ure to recogmze the love between two women. But this crime that 
~ a.i:,e ~ot speak its name-homosexuality-has suddenly in the late 
, r:'JJ'eth century begun to demand recognition, even in the face of 
~~:/ 
11 IMaking Justice 
resistance from the likes of a Chief Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court, who in 1986 cited "Judeo-Christian moral and ethical 
standards" to deny a fundamental right of homosexual sodomy in 
Bowers v. Hardwick (478 U.S. 186 (1986] C. J. Burger, concurring).3 
Although more recently in Romer v. Evans (1996 U.S. Lexis 3245) 
Justice Kennedy relied on the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to overturn a Colorado anti-gay rights initiative, 
federal and state legislatures, under the rhetoric of ethics and moral-
ity, are currently in the process of drafting and passing Defense of 
Marriage Acts that prevent the recognition of same-sex marriages, 
which the Hawaii Supreme Court has ruled are constitutionally man-
dated. Both sides of this struggle are no doubt convinced of the "jus-
tice,, of their cause. The national debate over the fairness of a legal and 
social system of justice that has blindly criminalized and condemned 
homosexuals since its inception indicates just how historically condi-
tioned and incommensurate our beloved virtue is. 
If Justice must step down as a result of the exposure of her notori-
ous selectivity throughout history, for theorists like Laclau, this de-
idealization is definitely a step in the right direction. This realization 
of the human and discursive nature of fairness empowers democratic 
subjects to demand recognition of their own versions of justice.4 That 
this public demand should occur as a result of the private love be-
tween two women seems at first blush to be the sensational stuff of 
made-for-t.v. movies; but the Sharon Kowalski case, which began in 
1983 and came before the Court of Appeals of Minnesota for the 
third time in 1991, represents a remarkable series of events that dem-
onstrate the social reality of one legal commentator's conclusion that 
the "prohibition on gay marriages may be the most significant form of 
discrimination on gay couples,, (Fajer 1992). The Kowalski case is a 
true story in the most oxymoronic sense of that phrase, for it has pro-
duced a series of discursive representations--case law, newspaper ar-
ticles, speeches, law review articles, and a book-that, I will argue, 
have harnessed the narrative power of social reality in order to create 
justice.5 Through the reiteration of the particulars of this singular 
story inside and outside the courtroom, a social text of justice emerges 
that demonstrates the viability of same-sex partnership and exposes 
the often arbitrary nature oflegal justice (Weber 1992). The Kowalski 
case illustrates the democratic potentialities of a pragmatic approach 
to justice that employs the power of discourse itself.-the telling of 
one's story-as a strategy for the reclamation of justice (Fajer 1992) . 
Although my principal concern will be the striking about-face 
that takes place between the official texts of justice-the Minnesota 
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Court of Appeals decisions in In re Guardianship of Kowalski 382 
N.W2d 861 (Minn.App 1986) and In re Guardianship of·Kowalski 
478 N.W2d 490 (Minn.App 1991)-1 am mindful of the need to 
present a statement of facts that will orient the reader to the whole 
story. Yet I am equally mindful that a recognition of the rhetorical and 
particular nature of justice makes it impossible to divorce the act of 
telling the Kowalski story from the presentation of a historical and 
pragmatic version of justice. In other words, there is no whole story 
that is not the side of a story, just as there is no statement of facts that 
is not also a statement-a qualitative assertion about the events related 
that is embedded in the selection of "facts" and the type of language 
used to describe them. Every law student learns that the statement of 
facts is the most important part of a legal brief. This lesson demon-
strates not only the embeddedness of abstract justice in its particular-
ized accounts, but also shows how justice inheres in the events that 
take place outside as well as inside the courtroom, in whose halls there 
exists "a socially institutionalised set of restrictions or limitations 
upon who may speak, how much may be said and upon what topic 
and in what contexts" (Goodrich 1987, 173). As I hope to demon-
strate, the differences in the Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions of 
1986 and 1991 court are telling, but what is even more telling is the 
deep description that is missing from each of those accounts. It is the 
untold story, in many ways the story of storytelling in the interim be-
tween appellate decisions, that embodies the methodology of chis so-
cial reversal of justice. What follows is not a neutral account of the 
Kowalski case, for there can be no wholly objective statement of facts; 
yet this restatement will detail the discursive and human movement of 
this story in and outside the courts of justice. 
On November 13, 1983, 27-year-old Sharon Kowalski was hit by 
a drunk driver while returning her niece and nephew from St. Cloud 
to the Iron Range near Duluth; as a result, she was severely impaired 
both mentally and physically.6 At the time of the accident, Sharon 
and her partner, Karen Thompson, had lived together for almost four 
years, exchanged rings, and named each other as beneficiaries on their 
life insurance policies. They were living together in a house recently 
purchased by Karen. Neither had told their parents they were in ales-
bian relationship. 
~When Karen arrived at the hospital, the staff in the intensive care 
unit refused to inform her of Sharon's status or to let her visit Sharon. 
r 
,; 
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For hours they refused to tell Karen of her partnees prognosis. Most 
intensive care units allow only immediate relatives to visit, and only 
blood relatives or spouses are allowed to make decisions for comatose 
or incapacitated patients. Sharon's parents eventually arrived, and ini-
tially they stayed at the couple,s home, allowing Karen to visit when-
ever she wished, but Mr. Kowalski began questioning why Karen was 
spending so much time at the hospital. 
In January, 1984, upon the recommendation of a hospital psy-
chologist, Karen wrote a letter to the Kowalskis disclosing that she 
and Sharon had been partners for four years. In March of 1984, 
Karen filed a petition in probate court to become Sharon,s guardian. 
Donald Kowalski cross-petitioned, and in April the parties entered 
into a court-ratified settlement agreement: 
The Court recognizes that Karen Thompson and Donald and 
Della Kowalski each have a significant relationship with the 
Ward, Sharon Kowalski, and finds each to be a suitable and 
qualified person to discharge the trust. 
However, in light of the difficulties existing between them the 
Court is unwilling to appoint joint guardians. Therefore, the 
Petitioner, Karen Thompson, agrees to the appointment of 
Donald Kowalski as guardian with no recognition chat he is the 
most suitable and best qualified among those available and 
willing to discharge the trust, but is willing to accept the Court,s 
appointment of Donald Kowalski under certain conditions and 
restrictions in order to avoid a contested hearing in the matter, 
which might not be in Sharon's best interest and in order to 
make every effort to resolve the difficulties existing between 
them. (In re Kowalski 382 N.W2d 861, 863) 
Under the agreement, the Kowalskis and Karen Thompson were 
given equal access to medical records and equal visitation rights, 
though the day after the settlement, the Kowalskis, meeting Karen in 
Sharon's room, told her to leave. In June of 1984, the probate court 
decided to send Sharon to County Manor Nursing Home in Sarrell, 
near St. Cloud. Karen spent hours each day visiting and working with 
Sharon, who by August was able to write, swallow, and even on occa-
sion speak. The Kowalskis visited their daughter less frequently; they 
lived further away and there was considerable animosity between 
them and Karen. 
cu 
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In September of 1984, the Kowalskis obtained a court order to 
move Sharon to Park Point Manor Nursing Home in Duluth. H r 
condition deteriorated at this time and she did not do well on tc t ·; 
administered at the Polinsky Memorial Rehabilitation Center. hnron IJ 
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began to be evaluated by doctors hired by her personal injury attor-
ney, Jack Fena, whom the Kowalskis had engaged. In hearings con-
cerning the proper placement of Sharon, the Kowalskis filed affidavits 
claiming that Karen was "controlling" and had harassed Sharon about 
money. 
In October, Karen began to consult disability organizations and 
civil rights groups. The St. Cloud Daily Times published an article on 
October 18 in which they describe Karen as "an assistant professor at 
St. Cloud State University (SCSU) who claims to have carried on a 
secret lesbian relationship with Kowalski for the past four years" (Th-
ompson 1988, 80-83). Donald Kowalski was reported as saying there 
"was no way" his daughter had a lesbian relationship with Karen, and 
"he said he and his wife are worried that Thompson will sexually 
abuse their daughter if Thompson is allowed to continue visiting her.,, 
"'(Karen Thompson) is about as sick as they come'," Donald 
Kowalski stated in the article. Thompson told the reporter that the 
Kowalskis had called and asked her if she had "'sexually abused our 
daughter today?'" The Daily Times also reported Thompson as saying 
"In our minds, we're married and are devoted to each other for a life-
time," and stating that she would set a national precedent for homo-
sexuals if she was appointed Karen's guardian. Thompson told the pa-
per that the Kowalskis were condescending, pampering, and ashamed 
of their daughter, and, according to Karen's attorney, might be 
subliminally blocking Sharon's progress so she will never be able to 
communicate her feelings about Thompson. 
In October, 1984, the Kowalskis filed for a temporary restraining 
order against Karen, while Thompson's attorneys petitioned for a sec-
ond psychological evaluation of Sharon and the removal of Kowalski 
as guardian. The court issued a restraining order on November 1, pro-
hibiting Thompson from disseminating the ward's medical records to 
the media, from bringing anyone with her to visit the ward, and from 
engaging in disruptive behavior at the nursing home. Sharon's day 
passes were also restricted. Donald Kowalski was also restrained from 
bringing visitors and disrupting the nursing home. The pending per-
manent injunction hearings and other motions were dropped by con-
sent of the parties in December. 
Meanwhile, Sharon was diagnosed with depression and her 
physical condition had deteriorated since her first residency at 
County Manor. Karen had videotaped her partner during her first se-
tics of recoveries and Sharon's condition had clearly regressed. Ac-
~cording to Karen, Park Point was louder and less clean than County 
rM:an?r, and Karen had to drive much farther to visit her. In January, ~ ~1:J ,,.,.__.,,. 
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Sharon typed responses at St. Cloud Handicap Services, confirming 
that she was gay and that Karen was her lover (Thompson 1988, 
Chronology). A rally took place in Duluth, protesting the conditions 
of Park Point Manor Nursing Home. 
Hearings on May 3 and May 9, 1985, ga~e rise to the, fir~t.Co.urt 
of Appeals decision. Donald moved to terminate Karens v1s1tat10~ 
rights and to find her in contempt. Karen moved to remov~ K~walski 
as guardian. The hearings featured testimony from a psych1atnst. pro-
cured by Jack Fena, the personal injury attorney. Dr. Cowan claimed 
that Sharon became depressed after Thompson's visits. Some doctors 
concurred. Although in June, 1985, Sharon communicated to the 
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union interviewer that she was in a rela-
tionship with Karen, the court ruled on July 23, 1985, that Sharon 
"lacks sufficient understanding ... to make ... responsible decisions" 
and that the "elimination of that conflict [between Don and Della 
Kowalski and Karen Thompson] and its adverse affect on the ward is 
in the best interest of the ward" (382 N.W2d 861 , 864). The trial 
court ordered the appointment of Donald Kowalski confirmed and 
continued but now without limitation or condition. Kowalski imme-
diately terminated the visitation rights of Thompson, the MC~U, 
and disability groups; he then moved Sharon to another nursing 
home in Hibbing. Karen and the MCLU appealed the decision whi~h 
was affirmed by Chief Judge Popovich in a decision handed down m 
March of 1986 (382 N.W2d 861 (cert. denied 106 S.Ct. 1467)) . 
After the decision, the headlines of the St. Cloud Daily Times read 
"Lesbian Bitter Over Decision," and the article contained an allega-
tion by Jack Fena that Thompson might be seeking guardianship for 
financial reasons since a settlement was pending on the civil lawsuit 
arising out of the accident. A letter to the editor reminded readers 
that Thompson, as guardian of Sharon's person, could not profit from 
her estate, and that Sharon had already incurred $25,000 in attorney 
fees. 
Karen continued to visit Sharon as a result of the temporary sus-
pension of the judge's order pending appeal. During these visits~ 
Sharon pleaded with Karen, typing, "Help me. Get me out of here ~ 
and "please take me home with you" (Thompson 1988, 162~ . ~n. 1:u- ~ 
gust 20, however, Dr. William Wilson suspended Karens vtS1ong ~ 
privileges. In a letter to Fena, Wilson states: "it has come to my atten- en 
tion that Karen Thompson has been involved in bathing Sharon ·~ 
Kowalski behind a closed door for a prolonged period of time. It has o 
also come to my attention that Ms. Thompson has alleged a sexual re- :~ 
lationship with Sharon Kowalski that existed prior to the accident. :: 
.. 
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Based on this knowledge and my best medical judgment concerning 
Sharon and her welfare, I feel that visits by Karen Thompson at this 
time would expose Sharon Kowalski to a high risk of sexual abuse" 
(163). Nurses notes during this period, however, continued to show 
how responsive and alert Sharon was when Karen worked with her. 
After Dr. Wilson's order went into effect, Karen would not see 
Sharon again for almost five years. She began to call disability action 
groups, gay organizations, and feminist activists. Her story was re-
ported in the alternative presses: The Advocate Qune, 1985), The 
Washington Blade (April, 1985), Ms. (Sept., 1985), The Progressive 
Quly, 1986). Donations and letters of support came. Karen met an 
openly lesbian legislator, Karen Clark, when she spoke at a Take Back 
the Night march in Minneapolis sponsored by the Minnesota Human 
Rights Commission. 
The second legal action that led to a published appellate court 
decision took place in December of 1985, when Karen brought a mo-
tion in district court to hold the guardian Donald Kowalski in con-
tempt of court for failing to take into consideration the best interests 
and reliably expressed wishes of Sharon Kowalski regarding visitation. 
The motion asked for rights of further discovery, further testing of 
Sharon, and the removal of Jack Fena as attorney for the Kowalski 
guardianship because of conflict of interest with the personal injury 
suit. These motions were denied on January, 1986 and the denial of 
Thompson's appeal is reported in 392 N.W2d 310. 
Meanwhile, Jack Fena had contacted the university newspaper at 
St. Cloud State. The subsequent article quoted Fena as stating that 
Thompson was invading Sharon's right to privacy and injuring her 
psychologically by divulging their lesbian relationship. He claimed in 
the article that Thompson's motivations were purely monetary, seek-
ing money from gay rights groups (Thompson 1988, 183-4). Similar 
articles appeared in the mainstream presses. 
Karen began to fly to California and Boston to speak about the 
case. She was approached by the co-producers of the Life and Times of 
Harvey Milk. She began to write a book with Julie Andrzejewski, Why 
Can't Sharon Come Home?, published eventually in 1988. Free Sharon 
Kowalski groups began raking shape around the country. Karen was 
contacted by 60 Minutes, 'West 57th Street, and The Phil Donahue 
Show, but none of these shows materialized when the Kowalskis re-
fused to participate. She finally did appear on The Sally Jesse Raphael 
_,.ShQW in St. Louis, but the one-half hour was shared with a rransexual 
( "md the in~roduction took five minutes. But Karen continued to ac-ce~t speaking engagements, for example, at the National Gay and 
~ . 
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Lesbian Health Care Providers conference in Los Angeles and the Gay 
Pride Rally in June of 1987 (Thompson 1988, 196-9). 
An article entitled "The Silent Ordeal" appeared in the Sunday 
edition of the St. Paul Pioneer Press also in June of 1987. "The Silent 
Ordea"l told the story of the Kowalskis who have "borne the emo-
tional burden of their daughter's paralysis. Their savings, their peace 
of mind and their plans for a leisurely retirement all have been lost." 
The article describes the despair of the Kowalskis as they "dutifully" 
drive ten miles "week in and week out" to visit "their eerily silent 
daughter" who "lies trapped in her twisted body" (Thompson 1988, 
203). The following month, the National Organization of Women 
(NOW) passed a resolution supporting Karen's case. In October, the 
National Committee to Free Sharon Kowalski was organized. 
Legal action began again in September of 1987, when Karen's at-
torneys filed a request for a competency hearing for Sharon. After a 
hearing in November, the judge ruled in February of 1988 that 
Sharon should be tested. The parties continued to litigate the ques-
tion of the place and identities of the testers. Finally, in May of 1988, 
Judge Robert Campbell ordered specialists at Miller-Dwan Medical 
Center to examine Sharon to determine her level of functioning and 
whether she could express her wishes on visitation. The doctors con-
cluded that Sharon wished to see Karen and visitation rights were re-
established in January of 1989. 
The conclusions of these new rests together with the national 
prominence that the case had gained led to articles in the Los Angeles 
Times (Aug. 5, 1988), New York Times (Feb. 8, 1989), and Washington 
Post (Feb. 6, 1989). The case was attracting legal attention as well: The 
Berkeley WOmens Law journal and Dayton Law Review both published 
articles in which the Kowalski case was cited. Karen Thompson's own 
book appeared in 1988. 
There were further developments in 1988. At the end of the year, 
Donald Kowalski notified the court that due to his own medical 
problems, he wished to remove himself as guardian. The civil suit was 
settled shortly before this announcement, awarding damages of 
$330,000 dispersed as follows. $119,000 in attorney's fees, $125,000 
for the State of Minnesota to offset medical assistance, $65,000 to the 
Kowalskis, and the remaining amount, approximately $80,000, was 
allotted to Sharon for her care. (A previous settlement had awarded 
$330,000 to Sharon in trust for distribution to her after she was 50 in 
2006.) 
On August 7, 1989, Thompson filed a petition for appointment 
as successor guardian of Karen,s person and estate, a petition whose 
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denial led to the most recent Minnesota Court of Appeals case in 
1991. No competing petition was filed, and the court held a hearing 
on August 2, 1990. The court wished to conduct further evidentiary 
hearings on the unopposed petition and evidence was taken for the 
next several months. Karen Tomberlin, a friend of the Kowalskis, con-
tacted Sharon,s attorney and stated she would like to testify in opposi-
tion to Karen,s guardianship and would be willing to be considered as 
an alternative guardian. The court heard testimony of 16 medical wit-
nesses, including physicians, nurses, and therapists, who testified to 
the benefits ofThompson's relationship with Sharon. Three witnesses 
testified in opposition to Karen's petition: Debra Kowalski, Sharon's 
sister; Kathy Schroeder, a friend of Sharon and the family; and 
Tomberlin. None of these witnesses had medical training or were fre-
quent visitors to Sharon. Sharon's parents did not attend the hearing. 
On April 23, 1991, the trial court denied Thompson's petition 
and appointed Tomberlin as guardian without conducting a hearing 
about her qualifications. The ruling was appealed, by Karen, with am-
icus briefs filed by the Lambda Legal Defense Fund, the MCLU, and 
NOW. On December 17, 1991, Judge Davies, finding a clear abuse of 
discretion by the probate court, reversed the decision and remanded 
the case with instructions to grant Thompson's petition without spe-
cific restrictions other than the accommodation of visiting rights for 
Sharon's parents (478 N.W.2d 790). 
Even after the case was remanded at the end of 1991, district 
court Judge Campbell avoided signing the guardianship order. Not 
until August of 1992 was Karen able to make arrangements to bring 
Sharon to her handicap-accessible home in Clearwater, Minnesota, 
where she and Karen now live with Karen,s other partner, Patty 
Bressler. While Sharon still cannot use the left side of her body and 
suffers from short-term memory loss, her doctors report that she is 
"thriving" in her new home (Thompson 1995, 96-101). 
Although the continuing jurisdiction of domestic relations 
courts over matters of custody and guardianship leads not infre-
quently to changing orders with changing circumstances, the 
Kowalski case nevertheless demonstrates a considerable reversal of 
outlook toward the competency of Sharon,s lesbian lover to provide fo~her. Yet this reversal comes not from some pre-millenial revelation {~_the Minnesota ~ourr of Appeals _in 1991 abour the inherenr injus-~ce ?f homophobia and heterosexism, but from a trial court tran-
'-,_"~~ o/ '~ 
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script so overwhelmingly conclusive of Karen Thompson's dedication 
to and support of her lover-together with an .absence of any substan-
·a1 evidence of obJ. ection to Karen or alternative to her-that the ap-
tl . f c 
ellate court was almost forced by that presentation ~ 1acts to sup-
:orr her claim. Justice is conrained within the evidenr1ary ':"5e Karen 
has presented, but that embeddedness ~s no~ a m~ure of its ~sured 
recognition or its existence as a transh1ston~al un1vers~. ~nst all 
seeming odds, the trial court ignored the sixteen medical witnesses 
(many of them independent), delayed judgm~~t for almost two years, 
and then ruled against the justice of the peanon. In many ways the 
indiscretions of the lower court are even more remarkable than the fi-
nal award of guardianship to Karen by the Cou.rr of Appeals. Unques-
tionably the divergence of opinion between tnal and ap~e~at~ court 
in their determinations of justice is evidence of Laclaus 1ns1stence 
upon the irrational and arbitrary antagonism-the lack of reason-
that inhabits social agency, including those that hol~ legal po~er 
(Laclau 1990, 4-5). But this radical critique of the arbiters of social 
justice is not an argument for nihilism; on the co~~ary, for La~lau 
this antagonism provides an opportunity for recognizing and capital-
izing upon the malleability of justice, as the perseverant Thompson 
did. l 
Nor can Thompson's achievement of guardianship ~e ~ccurate Y 
assessed as a victory for some notion of transcendent JUsace, ~ome 
stride toward a utopian, hate-free world. Had Donald Kowals~ not 
resigned as guardian, the probability of her having pr~~ed IS un-
likely. The chances of Sharon's sister or some~~e e.lse,, clruming guard-
ianship in the future are also uncertain. The JUSnce Thompso~ has 
won, after almost ten years of struggle, has left her with a legal bill. of 
$125,000 and a partner severely injured by a random enc~unter w_ith 
a drunk driver. Domestic partnership legislation protecong lesbian 
· H · · h · h been ruled and gay lovers is not in place, even in awau, w ere It as. 
to be constitutionally required. But the historically contingent az:id 
unstable nature of Thompson's success does not detract ~om its 
power or its ramifications; rather it proves that the assumed JUStness 
of discrimination against homosexuals is not as fundamentally un-
shakable as Justice Burger would have led us to believe (Bower_s v . 
Hardwick 1986). Thompson and Sharon's victory is evidence ~at JUS-
tice is indeed shakable and there for the shaking by those with the 
cu 
" ·-..
"' ::s
"" en 
c 
·-
stamina. th C 
Thompson goes out and makes some justice of her own from e .2 
time that she decides to go public in 1984 after the rem~val of Sh:Uon .~ 
from County Manor. Her public activism in the pursuit of her nghts :: 
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to a private domestic relation takes the form of telling her story, mak-
ing her case-producing forms of representation that enter into the 
social arena of antagonism where identity, the law, and justice are ulti-
mately forged. Those phone calls, letters, interviews, speeches, ar-
ticles, and books function as agents in the production of equity. Her 
success is varied and her tactics often backfire as she is accused of 
sensationalizing her supposed affair for monetary and political gain, 
accused of damaging Sharon by outing her, but these accusations are 
not completely inaccurate. Political gain is exactly what Karen's de-
mand for justice depends on, for without it, the political power of 
those who ignore, marginalize, and discredit gays and lesbians will go 
unchecked. Karen "outs" herself at the same time that she divulges her 
relationship to Sharon, and when she does come out, she faces the 
continued denial of a community that refuses to allow her to confront 
its open homophobia: her relation to Sharon is "alleged," fabricated 
for political gain, unfair to Sharon's reputation. Even when this crime 
dares speak its name, no one listens. When the St. Paul Pioneer Press 
and the St. Cloud Daily Times publish articles entitled "Lesbian Bitter 
Over Decision" and "The Silent Ordeal" in which Karen is depicted 
as a gold-digging political crackpot and the Kowalskis as Christian 
martyrs, Thompson finds herself answering charges of publicity-seek-
ing and outing while she tells her story of a woman loving a woman 
on the Sally Jesse Raphael Show. 
Ironically, Karen1s attempt to publicize her lover's plight takes 
place within a social climate where the myth of the private or 
unpublicized is linked to notions of rationality, level-headedness, 
non-distortion, and, by implication, fairness. From the moment the 
St. Cloud Daily Times on October 14, 1984 suggests that Thompson 
is a political feminist on a crusade to set precedent for homosexuals at 
the expense of the defenseless Sharon, the announcement of Karen's 
lesbian love becomes equated with sensationalism, possessiveness, 
ab~e, and even defamation. Jack Fena, the Kowalskis' attorney, capi-
talizes on the cultural taboo against telling the gay story when he 
thr:atens to sue .Kare? for slander, seeks a temporary restraining order 
aga.mst her for invasion of privacy, and uses Karen's publicity cam-
paign as evidence of her disruption of Sharon's quietude. The probate 
c.oun assi~ilates this notion of Karen's irrational and potentially ac-
uon~ble ~iscourse by ~uling that she is "overbearing,'1 "disruptive," 
and invasive of Sharons privacy (478 N.W.2d at 795). This rhetoric 
,rOf_ -privacy puts Thompson in a double-bind. On the one hand, 
( ~on's accident. and subseque~t disputes prove that privacy is pre-
:ro:isly unsustamable and demmental once a court needs evidence 
:~ 
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of affinity to award custody. On the other hand, when Karen does 
come out, she faces the ideological ethos of privacy that the courts 
and media use as a tool to condemn her publicity campaign. Her situ-
ation shows not just that the personal is inevitably political, but that 
the political constructs and maintains a notion ~f the p~rso~al or pri-
vate which privileges the propriety of not tellmg ones side of the 
story, not using discourse to demand one1s own :ersion ~f justice: By 
accusing Thompson of sensationalism and behavior that IS potentially 
actionable as a tort, the courts and mainstream media protect their ig-
norance of homosexuality by condemning, marginalizing, and scan-
dalizing its disclosure. This negation of public statements withi? ~e 
channels of public institutions is one of the primary ways those insu-
tutions preserve their versions of the truth by removing and denigrat-
ing other versions that enter the discursive marketplace. . . 
Yet it is precisely Thompson1s dogged process of naming, this re-
iterative and emphatic insistence upon telling her account, that even-
tually forces a judicial accounting of the validity of her same-sex part-
nership. Karen1s talks, rallies, meetings, and media appearances 
represent demands for recognition that are both "discursive," as 
Laclau notes, and sensational or "human": they evoke emotion and 
gain strength not primarily from an appeal to some illusory standard 
of objectivity, but from embracing the rhetorical and dramatic power 
of their narratives. In fact, the drama of Thompson's representational 
account is indivisible from its power as a tool for the reshaping of jus-
tice. 
Karen1s activism as a result of the decisions of the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals, her cause celebre, does not go unnoticed by the legal 
community, the Minnesota legislature, or the national media. Over a 
period of eight years, her own attorneys, the Minnesota Civil Liber-
ties Union, the Lambda Legal Defense Fund, and the National Orga-
nization of Women file over twenty motions, including appeals before 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Spureme Court of the 
United States in the first appellate decision. By the time of the 1991 
Court of Appeals decision awarding Thompson ·guardianship, the 
stamp of Karen1s extra-judicial activism is clearly detectable in the text .~ 
of the coures opinion. The once overbearing and "troublesome" ap- ~ 
pellant has now become "highly cooperative and exceptionally atten- ~ 
tive to what treatments and activities are in Sharon's best interest" en 
(478 N.W.2d at 794). Karen emerges as a "forceful advocate for ·~ 
Sharon's rehabilitation," and the court finds no evidence to suggest o 
that Sharon is "harmed or exploited by her attendance at public :~ 
events,,, including gay and lesbian marches and the annual conference =: 
... 
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of the National Organization of Women, where she received an award 
(478 N .W2d at 796). Nor do the judges find a conflict of interest in 
Thompson,s money-raising activities since all the money was raised in 
Sharon,s name. Although the circumstances of the case had changed 
?Y 1991, especially in regard to the ward's improved capacity accord-
ing to experts, the appellate court's opinion reflects a new respect for 
Sharo~ and Karen,s activism, care, and sexual orientation, a respect no 
doubt mfluenced by the national attention Thompson had worked to 
gain outside the courtroom. 
This publicity, whether within or outside the hallowed halls of 
justice, operates as a mechanism of power that draws attention to the 
legal and social vulnerability of lesbian and gay panners. If a theorist 
of sexuality and power like Foucault is correct when he argues that the 
deployment of sexuality operates by methods of power that are "irre-
ducible,, to "law», and embedded in techniques of "normalization,,, 
that the re~.ation of sexuality takes place beyond the state and its ap-
paratus withm a complex network of private regulations, discret-
i~nary decisions, and preferences, then Karen Thompson,s concentra-
non on the techniques of social representation serves as an example of 
how those techniques can influence the legal apparatus (Foucault 
1980, 89-90). By perseverance and determination, she makes the ben-
efits of her love known to her disabled partner, to the medical com-
munity, and to the community at large. 
. . The Mi~nesota Coun of Appeals' sudden recognition of the va-
lidity of lesbian partnership in 1991 stands in marked contrast to the 
opinions of the probate and appellate coun up to that date. One of 
the principal strategies of the initial appellate court decision by Chief 
Judge Popovi~h in 1986 entails the rendering of Sharon legally inca-
pable of making her own decisions or expressing her own wishes, 
thereby putting the court in control of her destiny. Minnesota law re-
q~r~. tha~ the "~est interest of the ward,, should be the guiding 
pn.n1c1ple m making the momentous decision of guardianship ap-
pointment, a determination creating a legal relation that makes the 
ward subject to greater external control over her life than if she were 
convicted of a crime.7 The ward's desire is an important factor in de-
ducing ~at i~terest but only if the ward has sufficient capacity to 
form an intelligent preference (Minn.Stat. 525.551 (5); 382 N.W.2d 
at 865). Affirming the lower court,s holdings, Chief Judge Popovich 
rules that Sharon,s inconsistent responses to questioning not only ren-
,.A~}ier stated preference for Karen "unreliable,, but also evidence her 
I al "' . ,, Sh CC• { ~eg.~ incapacity. aron. is burdendened with a child,s mental ca-
t . ~ j~j between four and SIX years of age,,, her "communication skills 
~:~ 
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are limited," and she may never improve, the court finds, upholding 
the probate court's decision and discounting conflicting testimony 
about Sharon,s responsiveness. Once the ward is found to be incapaci-
tated, the court as agent of the state gains the power to act as parens 
patriae in deciding the ward,s best interest (382 N.W2d at 863, 866). 
The court's arrogation of power over Sharon through the invocation 
of its latinate doctrine of state-as-parent illustrates what Goodrich 
calls the "alien linguistic practices," "the obscure, professionalized and 
impenetrable language" that the law uses to exercise its control 
(Goodrich 1987, 1). 
The court's "dumbing down" of Sharon, the reduction of this 27-
year-old woman to an unreliable 4-year-old child, de-sexualizes, de-
humanizes, and effectively silences her for purposes of the court's de-
cision. It also obviates the need to confront Sharon's lesbianism since, 
under this adjudication, she is legally too young to have a sexual pref-
erence, thereby supporting the court's continued ignoring of homo-
sexuality. Once the court determines that the fatherland knows best, 
the adjudication of Sharon's interest becomes a matter of interpreta-
tion by a parental appellate court and thus contingent upon that 
court's construction of the evidence. Sharon's adjudicated status as a 
child gives the court the leverage it needs to assume her ties are stron-
ger to her parents than to her "roommate" Karen. Not surprisingly 
"the unconditional parental love of Donald Kowalski," mirroring that 
of the paternal state, creates a legal presumption of qualification for 
guardian status which is "even stronger when the child has been inca-
pacitated to a four-to-six-year-old mental ability" (382 N.W.2d at 
865). 
Once Sharon is effectively silenced through her infantilizacion, 
her ties to Karen become not only inconsequential but in fact danger-
ous. Although the court recognizes the four years of co-habitacion, 
the ring exchange, and the life insurance policies, the relationship is 
still described as "uncertain,, (382 N.W.2d 861, 863). The court cites 
testimony of a closed bank account and a sister's testimony that 
Sharon told her that Karen was "possessive,, as evidence of this uncer-
tainty rather than the reverse. Although the court notes that Karen 
"claims a lesbian relationship," the opinion notes that "Sharon never 
told her family of such a relationship or admitted it prior to the acci-
dent." Instead of taking judicial notice of the stigma attached to com-
ing-out to the Kowalskis in the Iron Range, a working class area in 
Minnesota, the court uses Sharon's closeted status before the accident 
as evidence that she is not a lesbian. Sharon,s tescimony after the acci-
dent that she loves Karen is inconsistent and unreliable, and since she 
• 
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is a child now anyway, her sexuality does not exist. Sharon's near fatal 
accident has dealt a lethal blow to her sexual identity; it has disabled 
her from both within and without. The adjudication of her incapacity 
demonstrates that there can be no closet without a room of one1s own 
into which to emerge. 
Karen, on the other hand, is characterized by the court as a "pos-
sessi.ve" ~esbian wh~se "disruptive behavior,, and publicity-seeking dis-
semmation of medical records to the media must be restrained. The 
Kowalskis' disruptions and hate of Karen is ignored by the court. 
~ud~e Popovich cites a presumption in favor of "family ties,, in mak-
ing Its guardianship decision, a presumption that does not, of course, 
~end to ~ame~sex partnership because for this court the alleged les-
bian relationship is legally nonexistent (382 N.W.2d 861, 865).s 
C~nstructing justice around the denial and denigration of homosexu-
ality and false glorification of parental love, the appellate court affirms 
the decision of the probate judge based on the evidence from doctors 
tI:~t :the ward enters a detrimental, depressed state after Thompson's 
v1s1ts (382 N .W.2d 861, 864). The subtle demonization of Karen as 
an .~ressive lesbian whose domineering intrusion has psychological-
ly .1n!ured the helpless Sharon is writ large throughout the court's 
opm1on. The best interests of the ward are not what she wants because 
what she wants "upsets,, her and "results in her depression." The court 
must protect ~har~n from the feminist lesbian who is ruining her life 
and retur? this ~ild. t.o ,,the b~som of her family, where the "strong 
confidential relationship and unconditional love,, of the Kowalskis 
will shelter the ward (382 N.W2d at 865). 
In spite of the introduction of evidence that Sharon's depression 
occurred because she did not want Karen to leave and that Karen had 
devoted countless hours to her lover and made substantial reha-
bilitative strides with her, the court sees fit to uphold Kowalski's re-
fusal to al!ow Karen any visitation at all. This decision comes not only 
from .a failure t~ recognize the legitimacy of same-sex domestic part-
nersh1p--the failure to tell its story-the insistence upon its silence, 
but also. from ~e court's "ignorance" of Karen and Sharon's private 
love, wh1~h provides the opportunity to overlay its own story onto the 
case, the ideology of family values. The initial erasure of the homo-
sexu:i co~pl~ in love by the avoidance of Sharon's closet is followed by 
a re-mscnp~1on of the homosexual as single lesbian feminist seeking 
to undermine the unconditional love of parent and child. The 
~~,.!alskis' ag~, their ~ail.ur~ to take Sharon out of the nursing home 
( ~qn .any occasion, theu 1ns1stence that their daughter is a "severely 
r ;ribrrrdamaged" burden on their golden years constitute statements of 
\i..;Y 
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fact not part of the court's ideological narrative,. nor even part of the 
story of justice that their statement of facts will acknowled~e. The 
court's refusal to recognize the legitimacy of same-sex domestic part-
nership, no doubt for fear of its striking similitude to the sa
1
crament of 
heterosexual marriage, not only renders Shar~n ~d Kare~s four-year 
co-habitation as ring-exchanging "roommates weightless m the s~es 
of justice but also, in fact, under the transformatio.n ~f the s~y, .~ibl~­
toting Karen into a feminazi, turns their part~er~hip i?to a hab1hty in 
the annals of the family law courtroom. Theus 1s a discourse .tha~ ef-
faces same-sex domestic partnership and turns homosexuality in.to 
loveless sexual abuse that foments depression and disrupts the social 
order epitomized by the nuclear famil~. . . . . 
But the 1986 appellate court denves its ideological sense of J~-
tice not from the pre-ordained bedrock of Leviticus but from an ev1-
dentiary transcript that provides them with a srareme.n,t of facts upon 
which it can hang its homophobic hat. The Kowalskis ~~orney, Jack 
Fena, had engineered the removal of Sharon to a care facility removed 
from St. Cloud and provided the medical evidence necess~ ~o find 
that Sharon's incapacity rendered her unreliable. The psychiatrist, Dr. 
Cowan who testified to both Sharon's inconsistent responses and de-pressio~, was Fenas hired psychiatrist for the personal injury civil suit. 
(Fena had a vested interest in Sharon's non-recovery for p.urp~ses of 
that civil award but the court found no conflict of interest m his serv-
ing as both att~rney for the guardian and for Sharon in the civil suit 
(392 N .W2d 311, 314). Cowan1s conclusions were corroborated ?Y 
the affidavit testimony of Dr. Steven Goff of the Polinsky Memonal 
Rehabilitation Center and Dr. Julie Moller, the physician at the nurs-
ing home. But the court neither discusses nor cites the considerabl~ 
medical testimony to the contrary, including the evidence of Sharons 
previous recovery at St. Cloud. Jack Fena was also able ~o. build his 
case against Karen Thompson by seeking tempor~ restr<~.mmg ord~rs 
and supplying evidence of Karen1s supposedly disruptive behav~or 
over the conditions at the Park Point Nursing Home. Judge Popovich 
does not reach his decision in a complete ideological vacuum; he is 
able to locate a version of equity within the evidentiary transcript that .~ 
is provided by the advocate for the Kowalskis. That transcript tells a ~ 
story that silences Sharon, demonizes Karen, and re-instates the sym- ~ 
bolic paternal script that father knows best. . . . g' 
The most recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in the ·c 
Kowalski matter handed down on December 17, 1991, finds a clear O 
, , ·-
abuse of discretion by a uial court that has denied Karen Thompsons .!! 
petition for guardianship after Donald Kowalski1s withdrawal and ap- =: 
~ 
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pointed Karen Tomberlin guardian in her stead. Judge Davies reverses 
and remands the case with instructions to grant Thompson,s petition 
without specific restrictions other than the accommodation of visiting 
rights for Sharods parents (478 N.W2d 790, 796). Thompson,s peti-
tion to be successor guardian was filed on August 7, 1989, the law's 
year-and-a-half delay adding insult to the injury of a trial court's deci-
sion to award guardianship finally to Karen Tomberlin, a friend of the 
Kowalskis described by the lower court as a "neutral" third party 
needed to heal the wounds of a "family torn asunder into opposing 
camps" (478 N.W.2d at 794). Judge Davies is quick to point out the 
discrepancy between the trial coures adjudication and the testimony 
in the record. At the hearing Tomberlin testified that she was a friend 
of the Kowalskis and had a primary goal of moving Sharon as close as 
possible to her parents in the Iron Range, though she herself would be 
unable to take her in. Tomberlin rarely visited Sharon, but spoke with 
the Kowalskis on a weekly basis and was instrumental in securing the 
testimony of Debra Kowalski, Sharon's sister, against Thompson. 
Most importantly, the trial court presented no evidence of 
Tomberlin,s qualifications for the job under Section 525.551(5) of the 
Minnesota Statutes, which requires consideration of the ward,s prefer-
ence and the degree of commitment of the proposed guardian. As the 
Court of Appeals notes, "Sharon's current treating physician testified 
that she had had no interaction with Tomberlin, and she was not 
asked to evaluate Tomberlin,s knowledge of, or interaction, with 
Sharon" (478 N.W2d at 795). Judge Davies finds that a review of the 
record shows that Tomberlin is neither an impartial mediator nor a 
qualified guardian, that the facts do not warrant the justice meted out 
by the trial court. 
Behind the trial coures error in appointing Tomberlin, who 
rarely visited Sharon and who had not even formally petitioned the 
court for the successor position, was an obvious desire not to appoint 
Karen Thompson and to keep Sharon under the control of her family 
"torn asunder." The Court of Appeals counts the ways that the trial 
court "found fault" with Thompson, and each elicits a remarkable re-
versal in attitude (478 N.W.2d at 795-6). First the trial court "sug-
gested that Thompson,s statement to the family and to the media that 
she and Sharon are lesbians was an invasion of privacy, perhaps rising 
to the level of an actionable tort" (478 N.W.2d at 795). Secondly, the 
trial court took issue with Thompson taking Sharon to public events, 
/ ..including some gay and lesbian-oriented gatherings and other com-
f ~~ity events, reac~ng .no doubt to Karen's extra-judicial strategy of 
f rmaltipg her own JUStlce. Finally, the lower court found that 
-.."9 
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, l' · · of legal defense funds and testimony that she Thompsons so icitanon , 'd 
had been involved in other relationship~ since S~arons a~~i ent 
"raised questions of conflicts of interest with Sharons welfare (478 
N.W.2d at 795). l . · ful 
Although Judge Davies answers each of these.c aims ma ~e 
I hall discuss momentarily, the homophobia embedded in the way, as s Wh d · 
lower coures findings deserve considerable pause. at oes it say 
b · ty that makes it civilly actionable for one person to an-a out a socie 1 
nounce the sexual orientation of another, to allow ~ne person to co.-
lect damages for pain and suffering as a result of ha:mg her se~~al on-
. d'vulged~ Purun· g aside the pragmatic recognition of entation i . . . . 
homophobic antagonism in social reality, the trial ~o~rt in this case is 
seeking to cast Thompson's action as a tort, as a civil wrong-~anta­
mount to an assault or battery. Although bereft of all other n~hts, 
Sharon from the perspective of the probate court ~ho~ld be permi~ed 
to maintain her right to stay in the closet, to remain silent concernmg 
something about which society, in a more honest venue, has .promul-
gated the following rule: don,t ask, d~n,t tell. ~he golden sil:nce : 
this suggested tort is, however, sufficiently tellmg. ~ Sedgwick h. 
argued, "silence is rendered as pointed and performative as sp~ech, m 
relations around the closet" (Sedgwick 1990, 4). The not comin.g out 
story, which the traditional venues of legal justice have a vested inter-
est in maintaining, is a sub-genre in need of exposure. . 
The lower court casts the petitioner not only as a pote.n.tial 
tortfeasor, but also as an exploiter of the helpless Sharon for political 
propaganda. Taking judicial notice that Sharon and Karen were f~a­
tured guests at gay and lesbian rallies, the lower court chafes at ~e m-
b Th , 'al · 'sm the public re-fringement on its power y ompsons soci acnvi , . 
porting of her case to the community. The court,s five-year expulsi~? 
of Karen,s visitation rights and endorsement of Donald Kow~ski s 
guardianship have been in the "best interest" of Sharon as determmed 
by a paternalistic panel of judges, but Karen's removal .of her lover 
from an institution for an afternoon to attend a gay rally m her ho~or 
is judged exploitive. The threat of an adjudication o: justice outside Cll 
the venue of the courtroom leads the lower court to incorporate 3J.1d .~ 
· d' 'al · s within the dis- ""' attempt to condemn those extra-JU ici promotion ' 
course of the common law of invasion of privacy. The influence of ~ 
Thompson,s justice-making is great enough to lead to its citat.ion b~ a g' 
concerned probate court, demonstrating the power of her discursive 
·-. c 
accounting. , .2 
That influence also manifests itself in the lower courts first .!! 
h · · · der of pri- > charge of conflict of interest. T ompson is not JUSt an inva Cll 
~ 
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vacy and publicity monger; she is also con-woman. She has mar-
shalled the forces of LAMBDA Legal Defense Fund, the National Or-
ganization of Women (NOW), and the bleeding hearts of others for 
her own personal gain. Both of these organizations and the MCLU 
have also filed amicus briefs in the case, further evidencing the power 
Thompson has amassed outside the courtroom. At the August 2, 
1990 hearing, the lower court judge must have faced seven lawyers ar-
guing on behalf of Karen, sixteen witnesses testifying to her qualifica-
tions, and a courtroom no doubt full of the press. No wonder he took 
the case under submission for a year and a half, and then sought to 
find Thompson at fault for having such strength. 
The second conflict of interest charge suggests that Thompson is 
promiscuous and, therefore, not devoted to her lover. As if her charac-
terization as malfeasant, exploitative, and avaricious were insufficient, 
the lower court must also charge her with sexual misconduct. Her ad-
mission of sexual activity with others during the seven years since 
Sharon's accident has rendered her undevoted to the woman she "al-
leges" to have had a relationship with before 1983. To justify its rea-
soning, the court must put Karen in a double bind: on the one hand, 
her relationship to Sharon must remain "unclear," "alleged," and a 
maner of "privacy"; on the other, Thompson is compelled to remain 
committed to this fantasmatic "affinity" (478 N.W.2d at 794). 
The Court of Appeals' reply to these adjudications manifests the 
degree to which Thompson's representational pressure has effected a 
new anirude toward same-sex partnership. The invasion of privacy 
finding, akin to defamation, is obviated by the truth, as the statement 
of facts by Judge Davies makes clear: the nebulous four-year "room-
mate" designation of 1986 has turned into a "lesbian relationship" in 
which Karen and Sharon are "sharing a home in St. Cloud" (478 
N.W.2d at 791). What becomes "unclear" for this Court of Appeals as 
opposed to the 1986 court is not the existence of a lesbian rela-
tionship but the "extent to which Sharon had publicly acknowledged 
her preference at the time of the accident" (478 N.W.2d 795). More 
importantly, Sharon's doctors and therapists have testified that Sharon 
had voluntarily come-out to them on more than one occasion and 
that Thompson's earlier revelation was "crucial for the doctors to un-
derstand who their patient was prior to the accident" (478 N.W.2d at 
796). In 1986, Sharon's disability had rendered her desire to see Th-
ompson as "irrelevant" because "inconsistent" and against her best in-
/ Jer:_st. The medical justification for Karen's outing of herself and her 
/ ~er was not part of the 1986 record. Although the ward had made 
[ ffu~~r mental progress since the time of the accident, according to 
< _) J G;G/ 
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Thompson there was ample evidence of Sharon's acknowledgment of 
their relationship in 1986. The earlier Court of Appeals had arguably 
exploited the issue of capacity to insure that the question of sexual 
preference remain irrelevant except in so far as it was fabricated by 
Thompson. 
The 1991 Court of Appeals' decision lays the lower court's ex-
ploitation claim to rest by citing the testimony of Sharon's health care 
workers that she "'had a great time'" and interacted well with other 
people at these gay and lesbian events (478 N.W.2d at 796). The 
counter-testimony came from Debra Kowalski and Kathy Schroeder, 
a friend of Sharon's and the Kowalskis. They testified that they did 
not think Sharon would enjoy the events that were "gay and lesbian-
oriented in nature." The court dismissed this hearsay because Debra 
and Kathy, unlike the health care workers, were never in attendance at 
the rallies to evaluate Sharon's reaction firsthand. The likelihood of 
the Kowalskis visiting a gay and lesbian rally with Sharon is small 
enough to make the court's comment almost comic in tone: "they're 
here; they're queer; get used to it." 
Judge Davies also handily dismisses the conflict of interest claims 
by pointing to evidentiary findings, locating justice in the testimonial 
record of the lower court. All the money collected by Thompson was 
used to defray "the cost of years of litigation" and any extra was used 
to purchase extra equipment for Sharon-a voice machine, a motor-
ized wheel chair, a hospital bed, a lift. In fact, Karen, who emerges in 
a rather heroic light in this court's opinion, has built a disabled-acces-
sible home for Sharon in St. Cloud. 
Thompson's sexual relations with others during Sharon's 
convalescence, gleaned from the testimony of one doctor in the 
record, is assessed an occurrence that "is not uncommon" for spouses 
of severely handicapped patients and not indicative of a level of con-
tinued "commitment to the injured person" (478 N.W.2d at 796). 
The court cites with approval Karen's testimony that any third person 
in her life must understand that she and Sharon are "a package deal" 
(478 N.W.2d at 496). Remember that the 1986 court had depicted 
Karen as a potentially abusive, bitter lesbian who was attempting to ~ 
·-fabricate a relationship with Sharon for political and monetary gain, a 't; 
position not unlike the trial court's stance in 1991. Besides the impor- ~ 
tant fact that this transcript comes before a Court of Appeals made up en 
of entirely different judges, the re-casting of Thompson as a stellar ·~ 
care-giver-the recognition of the justice of her claim-must be at- o 
·-tributable in part to the uncommon strength of the petitioner's expert .!! 
testimony. There was no testimony from the health care community == 
~ 
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that could question Thompson's "interest or commitment" or her 
"ability to maintain a current understanding of the ward's or 
conservatee's physical and mental status and needs" within the mean-
ing of Section 525.539(7) of the Minnesota Statutes. In 1986, the 
Kowalskis' personal injury attorney had marshalled his own expert 
testimony to throw both Sharon's and Thompson's reliability into 
doubt. The preference of the ward, which by statute is also a major 
factor in the decision of guardianship, becomes a major factor in 
Davies' decision. Though the trial coun still insisted on Sharon's 
unreliability because of her inconsistency, the reviewing court finds 
that the medical testimony overwhelmingly shows that Sharon has 
proclaimed her desire to be with Karen. The silence of incapacity, ad-
judicated by the "discretion" of the family law judge, provided the 
lower court the opportunity to promulgate its homophobic ideology 
by rendering Sharon's sexuality both moot and mute. For Sharon, the 
finding of incapacity became the deadbolt on her closet. 
While the 1991 transcript quite clearly shows that the Kowalskis 
had to some extent given up the fight and that Karen had amassed an 
arsenal of accounts on her behalf, the immersion of justice in the mul-
tiplication of representation-the reiteration of one's story-does not 
entirely explain the unusual outcome of the this case. The divergence 
in 1991 between the lower court and the Court of Appeals reflects the 
depth of homophobic entrenchment in a social milieu that is facing 
new versions of equity in domestic relations. That the lower court was 
willing to face an almost certain reversal in order to prevent Thomp-
son from becoming her partner's guardian reflects the polarization 
that exists over the justification of same-sex partnership and, more 
fundamentally, over the rights of gays and lesbians. Those rights are 
neither fundamental nor absolute; they are sustained within a human 
and discursive context that is enmeshed in a symbolic network of 
"sensational" narratives, reiterated accounts that shape the parameters 
of values like justice. These forms of discourse vie for prominence 
within historical settings that substantiate Laclau's claim to an antago-
nism within the social subject that cannot be occluded or subsumed 
under an illusion of moral authority. 
The Court of Appeals concludes its opinion by chastising the 
lower court for its lack of respect for lesbian relationships: 
All the medical testimony established that Sharon has the 
capacity reliably to express a preference in this case, and she has 
:: clearly chosen to return home with Thompson if possible. This 
~ choice is further supported by the fact that Thompson and 
tr\ jharon are a family of affinity, which ought to be accorded 
\J;""J,,,1 
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respect. ( 478 N .W2d at 797) 
The victory of this lesbian couple is both a human and discursive 
one: Karen's story of domestic love has led the court to recognize the 
affinity between homosexual and heterosexual notions of family. At 
this discursive moment, the irrational basis of the antagonism that 
underlies any phobia-its status as a projection of one's fear of loss of 
self-definition-is demonstrated by the court's use of the loaded term 
"family" to describe a lesbian relationship. "Family," after all, is a code 
word for heterosexism, and the suggestion that such a symbolic signi-
fier could include the very homosexuality which it is often used to ex-
clude, strikes at the heart of the repressed affinity behind insistent dif-
ference. That affinity, which is at a fundamental level a fear of lack of 
autonomy, produces and will continue to produce versions of justice 
that will include and exclude, respect and disrespect. These historical 
versions are changed when narratives like the Kowalski case produce a 
statement of facts that deconstructs the boundaries of equity and calls 
for a new version of justice, which must recognize the "truth" or valid-
ity of the Sharon Kowalski and Karen Thompson story. Thompson's 
persistent re-presentation of her dramatic narrative in venues le~ 
and extra-legal exemplifies one way in which justice steps down and ts 
shaped by those who demand it. 
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*. ognJ!?On of the histonc1ty of bemg-and thus of the purely human and dis-
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cursive nature of t.ruth-opens new possibilities for a radical policies" (1990, 
4). 
3. For those who oppose homosexuality, it is a matter of taste, custom, and in-
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